Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman. About · Papers17 · Papers _ old9 · Teksty w j. polskim1 · PL: Samouczek logiki zdań. Logika nie gryzie I Aga Łamaga is on Facebook. Join Facebook to connect with Aga Łamaga and others you may know. Facebook gives people the power to share and makes the . R. Olejnik, Ćwiczenia z logiki praktycznej: zbiór zadań dla studentów zarządzania i marketingu, K. Paprzycka, Logika nie gryzie, Zysk i S-ka, Warszawa
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Skip to main content. Log In Sign Up. HartIdentity theoryand Lewis Carroll. The Knobe effect Knobe a consists in the tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. ESEE is loggika robust. I argue that when people attribute lpgika in morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim knowledge that a possible consequence of an action is that harm will occur rather than a predictive claim knowledge that harm will actually occur.
I use the omissions account to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases.
Unlike the doxastic heuristic account, the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slight-chance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account.
Grzyie of the studies involve close replications gryzei Nadelhoffer’s study. EpistemologyPhilosophy of Actionand Experimental philosophy. Intention, Knowledge, and Disregard for Norms: On the omissions account, attributions of intentionality are fundamentally dual: The root is the dual nature of commitments: Holton claims that there is a fundamental distinction between intentional norm violation logka intentional norm conformity.
Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility” more. I suggest that there is a tension in Clarke’s recent account of omissions or refrainings. On the one hand, he takes it that our concept of omission or refraining is uniform. This is a somewhat peculiar assumption given the repetitious This is a somewhat peculiar assumption given the repetitious use of the disjunctive phrase “omission or refraining” throughout the book.
On the other hand, he finds exceptions to many general claims he and others are inclined to make. One of those claims is the thesis that while some omissions are absences logiia action so literally nothing at allothers are actions. I suggest that it might be fruitful loguka accept a rival duality hypothesis, according to which there are at least two different kinds of negative expressions of agency: I show that the hypothesis can be helpful for Clarke.
When an Action is an Intentional Omission more. There are occasions where they might be used to attribute intentional omissions rather than intentional There are occasions where they might be used to attribute intentional omissions rather than intentional actions.
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One can thus explain a number of puzzles that have been taken to be puzzles about the concept of intentional action: The characteristic asymmetry in intentionality attributions Knobe effect can be explained by conjoining an orthodox theory of intentional action with a normative account of intentional omission. On the latter view: The omissions account further explains the Butler problem and some related puzzles.
It also safeguards the simple view of intentional action from the asymmetry challenge. Such arguments are susceptible to the neg-raising fallacy. I argue that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments e.
I conclude with a warning because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg-raising verbs olgika philosophically vital verbs: The Social Re-Construction of Agency more. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science.
Lowe argues that the mental event token cannot be identical to the complex neural event token for they have different counterfactual properties. If the mental event had not occurred, the behavior would not have ensued, while if the neural If the mental event had not occurred, the behavior would not have ensued, while if the neural event had not occurred, the behavior would have ensued albeit slightly differently.
His argument for the mental counterfactual relies on a premise that is plausibly false. The arguments presented support other counterfactuals, which are consistent with identity theories. Can a Spasm Cause an Action? An Argument for Responsibilist Theories of Action more. According to causalism, actions are events caused in the right way by appropriate mental states. According to responsibilism, the notion of action is understood as a complement to the notion of nonaction, which in turn is delineated by According to responsibilism, the notion of action is understood as a complement to the notion of nonaction, which in turn is delineated by the presence of defeating conditions e.
I argue that responsibilism does not, while causalism does, have a problem in answering the title question negatively.
Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman | University of Warsaw –
The fact that a spasm causes the arm to rise does not compete with a possible additional causal process with the appropriate mental etiology that leads to and overdetermines the very arm rising.
Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 Philosophy of AgencyAction TheoryH.
Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization more. Two questions have been discussed within the context of the action individuation debate. First, the question of action individuation proper — how many actions have been performed when one kills someone by shooting, for example. Second, the question of action externalization — what are the logija and temporal boundaries of the killing and of the shooting.
The internalists Davidson, Hornsby argue that the boundaries of actions do not reach beyond the skin of the individual. Ginet argue that the boundaries gryziw actions do extend beyond the individual.
The main problem for the externalists is to answer why so conceived actions are actions. Philosophia Philosophical Quarterly of Israel Philosophy of ActionAction Theoryand Individuation. Hendrickson argues that the coarse-grained account of action individuation is unwittingly committed to the metaphysical thesis that all causation is deterministic. I show that the argument does not succeed. On one of the interpretations, On one of the interpretations, all the argument shows is that the minimalists are committed to deterministic causation in a manner of speaking, which is quite compatible with sui generis indeterministic causation.
On another, the problem is that minimalism is taken to be committed to a necessary identity niw where the view is only committed to a contingent identity claim. I explore other strategies of saving the argument. In particular, I consider whether the argument will succeed if the designators in question are rigid. I argue that there are principled reasons for thinking that such a strategy must fail.
Metaphysical or Linguistic Indeterminacy? In reply to my criticism of his argument for the fine-grained theory of action individuation, Hendrickson proposes a new argument. He argues that the best explanation for the indeterminacy is given by the fine-grained view. I show that the argument fails for similar reasons. Minimalists have good reasons not to accept a crucial premise, viz.
Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips more. Sneddon on Action and Responsibility more.
Philosophy Documentation Center Publication Date: Polish Journal of Philosophy. False consciousness of intentional psychology more. Normative Expectations, Intentions, and Beliefs more. Southern Journal of Philosophy. Collectivism on the horizon: A challenge to Pettit’s critique of collectivism more. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Philosophy and Australasian Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Research. Cognitive SciencePhilosophyand Philosophical. Idealization in unitarian metaphysics more.
Springer Nature Publication Date: Cognitive Science and Philosophy. Denise Meyerson has recently argued that the adaptational account of false consciousness must appeal to a psychological element, contrary to explicit declarations of its proponents. In order gryzke explain why the rulers genuinely hold In order to explain why the rulers genuinely hold ideological beliefs, one must take them to desire Philosophy of The Social Sciences.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences. How Carnap should bite Goodman’s bullet more. Thinking about Provincialism in Thinking.
PhilosophyTeaching Philosophyand Education Systems. Jun 1, Publication Name: Przeglad Filozoficzny Nowa Seria.